This article examines what Joseph Schumpeter said on the emergence of novelty in economic institutions, what Sidney Winter did to build on and deviate from that foundation, and what puzzles remain. Winter built a framework for answers to a puzzle that Schumpeter could not solve-how novelty emerges in a system based on routines. He identified two major sources of novelty: the combinatorics of routines and the unreliability of routine imitation. As possible inspirations for further progress in evolutionary thought, the article points to ideas from chemistry, linguistics, and the diffusion of fashion for elaborations of these key Winterian insights.
Introduction
In his brilliant and pioneering paper on a neo-Schumpeterian theory of the firm, Sidney Winter anticipated many of the subsequent developments of an evolutionary approach to understanding firms and markets (Winter, 2006) . On this occasion, we want to acknowledge the debt of the field to Sidney Winter by reviewing briefly what Joseph Schumpeter said, what Winter did to build on and deviate from that foundation, and what puzzles the two of them have left for the rest of us. It is a journey worthy of considerably more elaboration than we can provide here. The resolution of all unresolved issues is left to the reader as an exercise.
A routine-based firm of limited rationality

Behavior as following routines
A conception of a routine-based, limited rationality is fundamental to an understanding of firms as developed by both Schumpeter and Winter. As Winter noted and applauded, Schumpeter saw the firm as embedded in a history and future with dimensions of space and time that make talk of an optimum frivolous and rational calculation of little value. As an alternative to assuming that firms were guided by explicit rational calculations, Schumpeter saw most of the behavior in business firms of his time as following routines, rules, and procedures that provided reliable responses to environmental changes. In his view, actions stemmed not from calculated rationality on the part of individuals but from a pattern of recognizing a situation and applying a routine developed through history to it. Thus, he asks himself how a farmer knows what to plant and when. His answer (Schumpeter, 1934: 6) was [L] ong experience, in part inherited, has taught him how much to produce for his greatest advantage; experience has taught him to know the extent and intensity of the demand to be reckoned with. To this quantity he adheres, as well as he can, and only gradually alters it under the pressure of circumstances.
Schumpeter's conception of routines
A comparison of the three editions of Theory of Economic Development-the first (1911) and the second (1926) German editions, and the English translation (1934)-shows that between each edition, Schumpeter made systematic changes that reflect some combination of changes in his thinking and changes in his relationship to the English language. For instance, he introduced the term "routine" in added passages in the 1926 edition and further expanded his use of this term in the 1934 translation, a translation with which he was very actively involved (Stolper, 1988 ).
Schumpeter does not simply translate the German term "Routine" into English. Rather, he captures a variety of German expressions in the English word "routine," even though in each case, a straightforward translation of the German expression exists. The record provides an insight into Schumpeter's evolving understanding and use of the idea of a "routine. Winter has a more specific idea of routines, and he sees them as the fundamental building block for an evolutionary theory of the firm. In particular, he has decision rules and standard operating procedures in mind (Winter, 1971 (Winter, , 1975 (Winter, , 1984 Winter, 1973, 1982) . In Nelson and Winter (1982) , "routine" is also used in the sense of an abstract "way of doing things," a performance program. In their treatment, a link to organizational memory is established by seeing routines as a coding of lessons from experience (Becker, 2004) .
The efficiency of routines
Both Schumpeter and Winter explore the efficiency of routines, their relation to procedures that would be in some sense "optimal." Without specifying the process in detail, both of them assume some process of incremental learning of routines that improves their efficiency. Schumpeter is inclined to think that although the time required to achieve optimality makes the point largely irrelevant, the learning process could lead to an efficient match between routines and their environments if given sufficient time.
The assumption that conduct is prompt and rational is in all cases a fiction. But it proves to be sufficiently near to reality, if things have time to hammer logic into men. ... But this holds good only where precedents without number have formed conduct through decades and, in fundamentals, through hundreds and thousands of years, and have eliminated unadapted behavior. (Schumpeter, 1934: 80) Winter appears to be somewhat less confident than Schumpeter that the adaptations of a learning process, as it meanders over a rough landscape, would ever reliably converge to optimal procedures:
No guardian angel stands watch over the firm's identity, and a sufficiently long sequence of incremental changes can make two initially similar firms dissimilar, or two dissimilar ones converge. (Winter, 2006: 140) Nevertheless, he sees the learning process as generally improving the fit of routines to their environments as long as the environments are reasonably stable. It is a vision that is consistent with some studies of the birth, revision, and death of organizational rules (March et al., 2000) .
Schumpeter and novelty
The central concern of both Schumpeter and Winter is not primarily with the normal functioning of a well-run, rule-based firm, reacting to changes in its environment by following routines that improve slowly with experience. Their interest is in more dramatic and innovative changes, what Schumpeter called "development." Schumpeter defined development as a change from one equilibrium, cost curve, or norm to another in such a way that the transition cannot be decomposed into infinitesimal steps (Schumpeter , 1939 (Schumpeter , 2005 . He insisted that incremental change and discontinuous change are completely different phenomena: Development in our sense is a distinct phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular flow or in the tendency towards equilibrium. (Schumpeter, 1934: 64) Schumpeter puzzled over how a theory of routines might comprehend novelty. It was an issue to which he returned frequently. How can novelty arise endogenously in a routine-based system? In the first German edition (1911) of the Theory of Economic Development, the character traits of the entrepreneur provided the answer: while hedonic, rule-followers merely adapt to changing circumstances, the energetic entrepreneur identifies new combinations and "pushes them through."
As he revised the book for subsequent editions in German (1926) and English (1934), Schumpeter apparently changed his views. Gradually, he shifted to a position that de-emphasized the dichotomy between incremental improvement and the introduction of novelty, blending these into a continuum. In the 1934 version of Theory known to most English-speaking readers, innovation is no longer attributed to a distinctive character trait of the entrepreneur. Rather, innovation originates in a depersonalized function of "carrying out new combinations," a function anyone can fulfill, which indeed can be a consequence of a sequence of operations within the firm by different people. Schumpeter, in fact, moved toward the idea of production functions, which could at certain times produce new combinations.
In his article Development (2005), Schumpeter identified the explanation of novelty as the greatest unmet scientific challenge. He considered three explanatory routes but did not find any of them entirely satisfactory: (i) character traits of entrepreneurs, as mentioned above; (ii) new combinations generated by production functions. He briefly considered interaction effects between different spheres of the social realm as possible causes of novelty but did not elaborate; and (iii) turning to theories of evolution for inspiration. Schumpeter's opinion of Darwin's evolutionary theory is not entirely clear, because it depends on an interpretation of the few remarks he made on the subject in his writings. As he clarified in Development, Schumpeter acknowledged the value of both Darwin's and Mendel's theories as explanations of incremental change. He did, however, dismiss both theories as explanations of novelty and discontinuity:
[D]evelopment is a problem, not simply of the facts but of our mental apparatus. This raises a difficulty, not for empirical research but for logic. This circumstance can be demonstrated for any domain you please, as for any domain of the social sciences. The theory of descent is particularly close at hand. Be it of the Darwinian type, with adaptation -which in a Schumpeter, Winter, and the sources of novelty 357 wider sense also includes decay -or according to the Mendelian type, with mixtures of constant elements. It always fails when it comes to the inaccessibility and indeterminacy of novelty and of the leap, even more so when such a theory of descent acknowledges the leap and names it, e.g. sport or mutation. It always runs into logical limits, or in other words, the fact that our logic is a logic of the adaptation process which can only deny or dismiss development. And precisely that explains what remains unsatisfactory about the matter, as can easily be seen. (Schumpeter, 2005: 117-118) Schumpeter saw clearly that "mutation," as that term is normally used in Darwinian evolutionary theories, is less an explanation than a label for the inexplicable. He tried, without much success, to identify "the process by which innovation -technological and organizational change -is generated" (Ruttan, 1959: 599) . He emphasized the impact of new combinations on competition. Famously, he identified five types of new combinations that mattered in this regard: new products, new production methods, new forms of organization, new markets, and new sources of supply. However, he was never able to link his typology of new combinations to an understanding of the processes generating novelty.
Thus, although Schumpeter saw combinations as involved in novelty, he found it difficult to provide any description of an inheritance mechanism that is any more precise than the word "combination." His interest in Mendel (and Mendel's discoverer de Vries; interview with Wolfgang Stolper, 4 August 2001, at his home in Ann Arbor, MI) might indicate that he hoped for the identification of some regularity underlying replications, such as the Mendelian combinatorics of reproduction. Neither he nor subsequent scholars have been able to find such regularities. Much as he tried throughout his career, he failed to generate any explanation of novelty (a fact that did not escape his critics, cf. Solo, 1951; Ruttan, 1959) . In Development, Schumpeter himself also arrived at the conclusion that he could not provide such an explanation.
Winter and novelty
Whereas Schumpeter flirted with evolutionary ideas but, for the most part, found them uncongenial, Winter embraced the fundamental ideas of evolutionary thought but bent them to fit economic life and thinking. Partly, the difference reflects the evolving nature of the biological theory of evolution, changes that made the theory more palatable to an economist of Winter's generation than to an economist of Schumpeter's (Mayr, 1982) . Partly, it reflects a difference between seeing the evolutionary glass as half-full (as Winter has) rather than half-empty (as Schumpeter did).
Like Schumpeter, Winter has rejected the standard interpretation of "mutation" as an unpredictable random event that is inexplicable. He has viewed such a formulation as unacceptably defeatist, much as Einstein is reputed to have viewed quantum mechanics (Pais, 1982) . In attempting to develop a conception of novelty in the firm, Winter has taken a route hinted at, but not pursued, by Schumpeter-paying explicit attention to the actual decision processes of a firm. Although Schumpeter (2000) had an interest in "technique[s] of production and the methods and ways of commerce," and "ways of doing things" (letter to S. Colum Gilfillan, May 18, 1934), he did not particularly focus on them in discussing sources of novelty. Without elaborating on the components of the firm, Schumpeter used the description of routines as a general foundation for a theory of prices that extended to the possibility of both disrupting and generating equilibria.
In contrast, Winter has seen studies of the processes firms actually use as fundamental to understanding novelty in firms. He has tried consistently to unpack the black box of the firm, the production function. He has focused on routines as (the most) important building block(s) for an evolutionary theory of economic change and development, making explicit the link between routines and genes (Winter, 1975: 101) that was carried over into the classic work with Richard Nelson: routines in general play the role of genes in our evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 400) The evolutionary framework has thus been harnessed for explaining change and development, and how novelty arises.
Behavioural routines do change over time, in both desired and undesired ways. Such changes correspond to mutations in the biological theory, and without them there could be no long-term evolutionary change. In so far as these changes are unintended and undirected, as many of them certainly are, the biological analogy is very close, and perhaps it can be extended to the realm of theoretical results. (Winter, 1975: 102) Along the way, Winter has largely ignored conventional distinctions between learning and evolution and between processes of variation and processes of selection. In doing so, he has made a fruitful link between students of novelty (variation) and students of search over landscapes (adaptation and selection).
Recent advances in the description of selection environments suggest a coupling between variation and selection that supports Winter's tack. NK models depend on the number of genetic components (to be recombined) and their interdependencies (Kauffman, 1993) ; and they have been widely employed in the study of organizations (Levinthal, 1997; Sorenson, 2002; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003) . These models produce a mapping of components onto fitness values that constitute the selection environment. Increasing the number of interdependencies among components increases cross-sectional variation in fitness, thus linking the combinatorics of components to the generation of variation.
Where Schumpeter thought mutations could not explain novelty, Winter has been more optimistic. His optimism, however, has depended on abandoning a central tenet of the classical biological theory of mutations, the idea that mutations are inexplicable, Schumpeter, Winter, and the sources of novelty 359 random events, and replacing it with ideas that associate "mutations," for the most part, with intentional, motivated change. Although the processes that Winter has emphasized are analogous in a very general way to those found in biological evolution (particularly some of its modern developments), by being attentive to the specifics of economic life, they deviate significantly from their biological forbears 1 :
[W]hile the decision rules themselves are the economic counterpart of genetic inheritance, the failure-stimulated search process apparently has no analogue in biological evolution -it would correspond to a mechanism that automatically generates a burst of mutations when they are needed. (Winter 1971: 245) [A] slavish pursuit of the biological analogy would be counterproductive, for it is quite clear that the bulk of what we count as interesting longterm change in business behavior is not the product of blind chance. Rather, it is deliberate innovation, the product of directed effort, typically undertaken in response to identifiable economic stimuli, and motivated by profit consideration. Thus, with a considered step away from the biological theory, it is proposed that deliberate innovations, large and small, be counted as the most significant subset of the changes in routine behaviour. (Winter, 1975: 102) Winter (1964, 1971 ) drew ideas of failure-induced search from work on a behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) and proposed that a theory of innovation emphasizes such motivations for intentional change.
When the firm is doing well, it will not expend time and money on "search activity." Thus if a firm is behaving according to a routine that is actually viable, given the existing competition of other organization forms and the character of the environment, it will not be inclined to depart from the routine. (Winter, 1964: 264) Continuing that line, Nelson and Winter argued that ...the observed role of simple decision rules as immediate determinants of behavior, and operation of the satisficing principle in the search process of new rules, provided the required genetic mechanisms. (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 42) The direction was cheered by Redlich, who contrasted it with Schumpeter's ideas: 1 Over the last two decades, molecular biology has begun uncovering some sources of mutationally defined genes, in terms of their molecular identities and mechanisms of regulation (Haag and True, 2001) . However, any connection between these results and the Winter emphasis on intention and motivation is obscure. Thus, "mutation" of routines, that is, the production of novelty in organizations, came to be pictured as driven by processes of failure-induced search:
Our concept of search obviously is the counterpart of that of mutation in biological evolutionary theory. ... And our treatment of search as partly determined by the routines of the firm parallels the treatment in biological theory of mutation as being determined in part by the genetic makeup of the organism. (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 18) In the Winter formulation, search stimulated by the experience of failure has been supplemented by imitative search, the copying of routines used by other firms.
The second type of search process is an imitation mechanism: The firm is more likely to consider a given technique the greater the percentage of current industry output produced with that technique. (Nelson and Winter, 1973: 442) In this way, Winter has addressed Edith Penrose's (1952) critique of the use of biological analogies in economics. She had noted the problem of identifying an economic counterpart of genetic inheritance. Winter found the counterpart in failure-induced search and the imitative replication of successful routines. To some extent, the Winter approach had been anticipated by Alchian (1950: 215-216) , who emphasized "reproduction" via imitation of rules of behavior.
By framing the mutation process as involving failure-induced search for new routines, and the attempted replication of routines used by others, Winter opened the door to a consideration of the imperfections of search and imitation. Other researchers have identified relevant systematic cognitive biases and errors that agents have and commit (Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Reason, 1990; Fiske and Taylor, 1991) and the systematic variation introduced by such biases and errors (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992; Denrell, 2005) . Within such a perspective, it is possible to ask the much more concrete question: What are the sources of variation arising in the replication process, and what are their effects on a history of change? Answering those questions has, however, proven to be difficult.
The thorny problems of novelty
As Winter has consistently recognized, a neo-Schumpeterian theory of the firm requires a theory of changes in routines that accommodates three rather different kinds of changes: (i) incremental changes in existing routines on the basis of experience; Schumpeter, Winter, and the sources of novelty
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(ii) inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion of routines; and (iii) endogenous generation of new, distinctively novel routines.
The incremental change of routines seems reasonably well comprehended within a theory of experiential learning (Levitt and March, 1988; Greve, 2003) . Some of the relevant properties of experiential learning have been documented in recent work (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Denrell and March, 2001; Denrell, 2005) . In particular, it is clear that experiential learning is myopic (Levinthal and March, 1993) and is vulnerable to errors attributable both to human biases and to the conflicts within an organization (Lounamaa and March, 1987; Reason, 1990; Denrell, 2005) .
The diffusion of routines seems reasonably well comprehended within an epidemiological theory such as modern versions of "institutionalization" in sociology. Some of the relevant properties of the diffusion of routines have also been documented in recent work (Attewell, 1992; Westphal et al., 1997; Strang and Soule, 1998; Miner and Raghavan, 1999) . In particular, it is clear that a theory of the diffusion of routines has to relax two common assumptions of conventional epidemiological models-the assumption of reproductive reliability and the assumption of network exogeneity (Anderson and May, 1991; March, 1999) .
Diffusion research casts some light on the way the incremental spread of routines sometimes leads to wide adoption and notable persistence in routines (Fischer, 1989; Vincenti, 1994; Nelson et al., 2004) . Accounting for the reliable spread of more complex routines is a challenge, but recent work indicates how it can happen. One example is the "McDonalds approach" where a common template with a proven track record facilitates reliable replication of a large number of similar outlets that deliver a product or perform a service (Winter and Szulanski, 2001) .
Accounting for the reliable spread and differential adoption of routines is only part of the puzzle, however. What is missing is a theory of the endogenous generation of distinctively novel routines. For Schumpeter and Winter, as well as others, the problem seems to be: Where do we look for mechanisms of such variation? Some of Winter's most important contributions lie in his attempts to illuminate two such mechanisms: first, the combinatorics of routines and, second, the unreliability of routine replication.
Combinatorics of routines
Winter has tried persistently to identify regularities in combining routines (similar in a very general way to Mendelian combinatorics).
The canonical question of evolutionary theory is this: Consider a group of firms, operating according to specified routines -subject to modification by specified search rules -in a specified market environment. Which classes of routine behaviour are capable of protracted coexistence with each other, without producing, out of their own dynamic logic, pressures for change? What classes are mutually incompatible or antagonistic, and in what time frame is the clash likely to become acute? (Winter, 1975: 108-109) To command explanatory and predictive power similar to Mendel's laws in the realm of biology, however, we need to respond to questions such as: What are the basic phenomena resulting from combinations of routines? What new routines are generated by the coming together of routines? To some extent, this is consistent both with Schumpeter's interest (interview with Wolfgang Stolper, 4 August 2001, at his home in Ann Arbor, MI) in the ideas of de Vries (1901 de Vries ( -1903 and with Winter's emphasis on the role of reliable routines in producing novelties (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Winter, 2006) . The study of the combinatorics of routines is, however, in its infancy.
How and with what success it will develop is unclear.
Unreliability in the imitation of routines
Most ideas about the diffusion of ideas, routines, or technologies proceed, sometimes explicitly, from a conception of "progress." They assume processes that make at least local discrimination between what apparently leads to failure and what apparently leads to success. The vision is one of processes subject to error but basically tending toward improvement.
Although Winter is reasonably comfortable with such a vision, he qualifies it in two important ways. First, he is quite conscious of the meandering character of history and the many occasions on which adaptive processes fail to achieve global maxima Winter, 1964, 1982; Winter, 1971) . Second, he understands the potential for variation found in the unreliability of the replication of routines as they spread to new places and activities. Attributing the origin of novelty to unreliability in replication, however, begs for a better explanation of such error. Without it, unreliability becomes an instance of mutation, an unpredictable random event perturbing a routine when it is imitated or reproduced. For Winter, the goal is to discover comprehensible sources of novelty in the mechanisms of imitation.
In his work on routine replication, Winter pointed to incompleteness in a template for routine imitation as a source of copying error (Winter and Szulanski, 2001 ).
[T]he template provided by the existing routine may not yield a good copy. There will be some mutation of the routine as it is transferred to the new plant. Of course, perfect replication is not more of an ultimate objective than perfect control. What matters is not that the plant be the same, but that it work with overall efficiency comparable to the old one. (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 121) In Winter's view, such incompleteness in a template is often linked to the underlying combinatorics of its components. This is the case when the intricate combination of personnel and equipment involved in a routine is hard to grasp (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter and Szulanski, 2001) . Reproduction on the basis of a few controlled Schumpeter, Winter, and the sources of novelty 363 components in a routine will be a random walk over combinations of uncontrolled attributes. With interdependencies among components (as opposed to unrelated components), the walk will exhibit more variation. In his search for an explanation of the emergence of distinctively novel routines, Winter thus pointed to the linking of properties that arise from the combinatorics of a routine's components to the generation of new variation in its reproduction.
Toward an evolutionary economics
The original core ideas of evolutionary models in biology and economics emphasized adaptation to an exogenous environment through differences in the survival rate of genes (routines) and through differences in the replication rate of genes (routines) that reproduce precisely except for rare, random mutations. Variation in survival and birth rates are described as fitness components that reflect differences in the adaptiveness of traits to the environment, and traits are thought to reflect genetic variation reliably.
Variation among genes is produced by mutations, and variation among genetic combinations is produced by reproductive combinatorics. Selection among genes is produced by selection among genetic combinations. Selection feeds on variation in trait differences to produce genetic distributions that better reflect the requirements of the environment. Insofar as the selection process involves reproductive combinatorics, it also reproduces the variation it feeds on. The process is imagined to be relatively efficient in matching gene pools to environments.
Modern evolutionary models fit generally within that structure, but they fiddle with it considerably:
• They are inclined to portray environments as endogenous. They emphasize the effects of competition and the coevolution of species in an interactive ecology.
• They are inclined to picture selection processes as relatively complex, operating at multiple levels of biological (social) organization, and involving multiple interdependent selection criteria (fitness components).
• They are inclined to attach greater importance to genetic and trait combinations and interactions as factors in the survival of genes and traits, noting such phenomena as mutualisms and "hitchhiking."
• They are inclined to view the correspondence between genetic variation and trait variation as imperfect and stress the role of the latter in producing evolutionary outcomes.
• They are inclined to see evolutionary processes as inefficient in the sense that they have multiple equilibria and do not reliably discover optima.
• They are inclined to view mutations less as inexplicable random error than as changes caused by comprehensible processes.
• At least in economic versions, they are inclined to introduce cognitive and organizational mechanisms of conscious behavior such as anticipatory, intentional search and choice, internal conflict, and deliberate imitation into both selection processes and the processes of mutation.
The result has been that the models have become both considerably more consistent with observations of evolutionary histories and processes and considerably less tractable. The observed phenomena are more complex than our representations and understandings of them. It is an old story, from which it is possible to draw either pain or pleasure, but the latter seems more consistent with the celebration of Sid Winter. In that spirit, we might suggest two possible elaborations of the key Winterian insights. The first is a set of possible directions for pursuing the combinatorics of routines. The second is a set of possible directions for pursuing the diffusion of routines.
Combinatorics of routines
Consideration of Mendelian reproductive combinatorics is an obvious stimulus to a search for understanding the combinatorics of routines as a factor in economic evolution. The problem with using Mendel as a model, however, is that Mendel's theory was developed on the basis of an enormous number of empirical, especially experimental, studies of the replications of genetic combinations. There is nothing even remotely similar in studies of routines in firms and the reproductions ensuing from mixing them. There are, however, some starts that suggest the Winter vision may not be entirely unreasonable.
For example, Brian Pentland has pioneered an analysis that involves decomposing observable routines into constituent components, thus portraying routines as sequences of "moves" (Pentland, 1995 (Pentland, , 2003 . He has identified possible combinations of routine components but only observed some of these empirically. For our purpose, one interesting question addressed in Pentland's research is: Why are some theoretically possible combinations not observed in practice? Pentland's answer is that interdependencies among routine components prevent some of the theoretically possible combinations from being implemented in practice (for instance, the text must be prepared before it can be printed).
In further pursuit of the basic perspective, Pentland has followed the lead from evolutionary studies of language (Bloom, 1973; Bickerton, 1981 Bickerton, , 1990 Chomsky 1986 , Pinker, 1994 in focusing on rules that comprise a "grammar of action" (Pentland and Rueter, 1994) . Grammar is an evolved system of rules governing how words combine to produce meaning. Historically, poetry has served as a domain of grammatical experimentation, as has the process of learning the rules by children and by persons acquiring a new language. A grammar of language tolerates only rather modest violations, however. Swapping two words in a sentence can produce poetic novelties or utter nonsense. Linguistic combinatorics stimulates error correction by providing positive feedback to word combinations that are consistent with grammar and negative feedback to word combinations that violate it.
Grammar provides an error threshold that facilitates the reliable reproduction of word combinations, a process that tends to reinforce the use of particular simple word combinations. As simple word combinations become stable, they can be substituted for words, thus generating a nested hierarchy of word combinations that produce meaning. The length of meaningful sentences is testimony to the level of reproductive reliability achieved in linguistic combinatorics.
The similarity between language grammar and the regularity underlying the Mendelian combinatorics of reproduction has been noted in recent work (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999) . Grammar increases reproductive reliability by constraining variation in word combination (novelty). The effect of increasing the reliability (and force) of reproduction by constraint is a well-known phenomenon in epidemiological studies that take immune response into account. Extending this vision to the production of stable behavioral combinations is a start, however far the reliability of routine replication may be from Mendelian precision.
Considering a combinatorics of routines that preserves reproductive reliability in ways similar to a grammar of language also points to a few missing items in such a vision. It is presently unclear how we account for the ability to acquire grammar; we do not know how grammar evolves; and it is hard to explain the spread of grammatical novelties-as opposed to new words (Bickerton, 1981 (Bickerton, , 1990 Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999; Pinker, 1994) .
Another possible clue to a theory of combinatorics is provided in the observation that the combinatorics of language shares some features with the laws of chemistry (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999) . For example, well-understood physical principles explain how chemical components combine to make stable or unstable compounds. Some chemical compounds can also reproduce by generating autocatalytic cycles, that is cycles of systematic transformation that multiply their constituent compounds. Generally, the limited reproductive reliability of autocatalytic cycles tends to spawn combinations that yield degenerate cycles and instability. In some cases, however, physical laws facilitate the emergence of stable complex autocatalytic cycles by constraining the interaction among chemical compounds (and by exploiting catalytic stimulants, such as enzymes), much in the way that grammar facilitates reliable reproduction of word combinations. Perhaps, similar structuring principles within economic institutions are required for the emergence of stable cycles of selfreproducing routines that exhibit some level of complexity.
In recent work, John Padgett and coworkers have pursued a chemical perspective in accounting for economic production as an instance of routine combinatorics. As in the origin-of-life problem, Padgett et al. (2003) are concerned with the formation of stable cycles of compounds (routines) from a "soup" of random components. Their work on production as chemistry confirms prior work (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988) by identifying a threshold that limits the size of viable cycles to a very few components (five or less) in the absence of constraints on component interaction. Only if exogenous constraints on component interaction are present, do more complex production cycles become stable (Padgett et al., 2003) . The level of complexity in the cycles produced in this work is not comparable to the level of complexity observed in DNA, English sentences, rules governing social institutions, or routines in a shop floor; but the research provides a possible approach to studying and understanding the combinatorics of routines in economic life.
In a related but quite different direction, Padgett has sought to understand the evolution of a political system in Florence (Padgett and Ansell, 1993; McLean and Padgett, 1997; Padgett, 2001 ). This work also indicates that the emergence and evolution of complex rules and routines that characterize exchange in a market economy and political system are facilitated by structuring principles that limit interaction among actors.
Padgett and his coworkers suggest that understanding the emergence and evolution of routines may be informed by understanding the principles that account for the emergence and evolution of chemical compounds. A similar conclusion is reached by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1999) in suggesting that any system capable of generating increasingly complex cycles that continue to feed on the variation they produce can be informed by an understanding of chemistry. The genetic code and human language are canonical examples of such systems. It seems imaginable that emergent cycles of rules and routines have a similar role in explaining the evolution of social institutions.
Diffusion of routines
By noting some of the ways in which imitation is an imperfect replicator of routines, Winter anticipates recent work emphasizing that diffusion involves systematic transformation of routines in association with their transfer (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996, 2005) . Such an interest might well lead Winter to theories of fashion (Abrahamson, 1991; Kieser, 2002; Czarniawska, 2005) . The fundamental difference between theories of fashion and most theories of learning or evolution in economics is that there is no idea of progress in theories of fashion. It is what Young called "evolution without destination." (Young, 1973: 109) . Fashions cycle without (for the most part) becoming better, or better "fit," to their environments. They are, in that respect, different from the usual conception of diffusing technologies or knowledge; but the difference shrinks almost to the vanishing point in a Winterian formulation.
A fundamental problem for theories of fashion, as for theories of learning or evolution, is to account simultaneously for the incremental spread of an idea, practice, style, or enthusiasm, and for its discontinuous displacement by another.
Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation. ... At the same time, it satisfies in no less degree the need of differentiation, the tendency for dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast. (Simmel, 1971: 296) What Winter's insights suggest (though not explicitly to him) is that understanding novelty in business firms may be informed by understanding novelty in fashion. Because theories of fashion fit the political and epistemological world views of most sociologists better than they do the political and epistemological world views of most economists, they are more common in sociology than in economics. However, as Winter implicitly recognizes, the difference between sociological theories of fashions and economic theories of technological change appear to be greater than the difference between processes affecting the distribution of skirt lengths and processes affecting the distribution of production technologies.
Fashion seems capable of generating increasingly complex cycles that feed on the variation they produce. If fashion cycles are indeed captured by such a description, we would expect them to be governed by a "grammar of fashion," a structuring principle that constrains interaction among fashion components. A grammar of fashion would increase the reliability (and force) of reproduction by constraint as would infections that are countered by immune response. Although specific equations would be highly speculative at this point, it is possible that immune response to fashion (infection) is driven by periodic variations in susceptibility that can be captured by a system of (three or more) equations exhibiting chaotic variation (Anderson and May, 1991) . Such a perspective is likely to help understand novel combinations of skirt length and color (as well as novel combinations of routines) in response to variations in local taste, even though it may fall short of accounting for a gradually evolving complexity in fashion cycles (routines).
The point is not that these particular directions are strikingly more promising than all others. They illustrate possibilities that owe debts both to Schumpeter and to Winter for their persistence in pursuing an understanding of the sources of novelty in economic institutions. Sidney Winter might well have relaxed after elaborating the Schumpeterian vision of economic development into an articulate linking of ideas of rule-based actions in firms with ideas of evolutionary change and after noting the difference between incremental improvement and the introduction of novelty. However, he did not. Without contradicting the Schumpeterian vision significantly, he built a framework for answers to the part of the puzzle that Schumpeter could not solvehow novelty emerges in a system based on routines. He identified two major sources of novelty: the combinatorics of routines and the unreliability of routine imitation. Winter's ideas that evolutionary economics might seek to capture critical features of the reproductive unreliabilities generated through combinations of routines and their diffusion are noble, even Nobel, thoughts. Building on those should keep the rest of us busy for another fifty years or so, if Sid does not beat us to it.
